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Measuring Market Damage of Automobile Related Carbon Tax 





  This paper tries to evaluate the market damage of automobile related carbon tax to be imposed as a 
control of CO2 emissions. Japanese Ministry of Transport set up a target of the GHG emission level of 
transport sector at 2008 to 2012 as 17% increasing level from 1990 level. In order to comply with this 
target, Ministry of Transport has been investigating the feasibility and acceptability of automobile related 
carbon tax. But the economic damage of those policies is not elucidated enough. Hence we evaluate its 
influence on the market economy by applying the dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) 
model. The model has characteristics of explicit formulation of the automobile related industrial and 
transport sector’s behavior and household travel behavior. 
  With this model, we identify the automobile related carbon tax levels needed to accomplish the 
regulatory target of CO2 emissions at transport sector for two cases with respects to the price elasticity in 
fuel demand. In the lower elasticity case of 0.1, the necessary carbon tax is 112[thousand yen/tC] and the 
associated market disbenefit is 1,810[billion yen/year]. In higher elasticity case of 0.3, the necessary 
carbon tax is 119[thousand yen/tC] and the market disbenefit is 2,490[billion yen/year]. In addition to 
above analysis, we also evaluated the subsidy policy for clean energy vehicle.  
1.  Introduction 
 
  Issues of external diseconomies caused by automobiles have been a more serious 
problem. Especially, the damages suffered by Green House Gas (GHG) emissions are 
recognized as global warming and, at the Kyoto Protocol (COP3), the regulatory targets 
of GHG emissions were specified for signatory countries. The target for Japan is 6% 
reduction from 1990 level in the period 2008-2012, and the target of transport sector 
was set up by Ministry of Transport, which is 17% increasing from 1990 level. Ministry 
of Transport has estimated to grow the GHG emissions by 40% if no policies were 
performed. To reduce GHG emissions exhausted by automobiles is, therefore, an 
important task because the emissions of them occupy 90% of all transport sectors. 
  On the other hand, the policies based on market mechanism, like an environmental 
tax, have been proposed in order to regulate GHG emissions. The impacts exerted by 
executing these policies, however, are not elucidated enough. It is well known that these 
policies raise commodity prices through the increase of automobile user’s costs, and, as 
result, the huge welfare loss, what is called deadweight loss, is possible to be generated. 
Those recognition leads to need to evaluate synthetically the economized environmental 
policies by calculating the deadweight loss due to executing these policies. 
  In this paper, we focus on the carbon tax policy imposed only to automobiles, and 
evaluate it with the dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model. In this 
DCGE modeling, the economic behaviors of household and industries, and the 
mechanism of market are formulated by mathematical programming, and the dynamic 
path is calculated. Hence the model allows us to grasp the change of agents’ behaviors 
due to introduce the carbon tax, and measure the damage given to market economy, 
what is named by us the market disbenefits, by utilizing the concept of equivalent 
variation. Note that we ignore the social benefits generated by reducing GHG emissions, 
in other words we assume here that their benefits are not occurred in the studied period.   
  The CGE approaches have been developed to evaluate economic impacts with 
introducing tax policy or international trade policy, which are surveyed by Shoven and 
Whalley (1984). Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) and Bergman (1991) applied the CGE 
model for the environmental policy evaluation. Such approach had been more exquisite 
by Ballard and Medema (1993) and Goulder et al (1999), and applied to the transport 
environmental problems by Borger and Swysen (1998) or Mayeres (2000). Recently, in 
the magazine of the review of urban & regional development studies (RURDS), a 
special edition on the CGE approach compiled in 2003. In there, Roson (2003) or Rana 
(2003) computed the economic impact of CO2 emission controls. 
 The DCGE model of this research follows those previous CGE approaches in 
principle. Our model explicitly formulates, however, the automobile related industrial or 
transport sector’s behavior and household travel behavior. Especially, the travel 
behavior for private tips of household is formulated by the probability choice paradigm 




2.  Partial analysis   
 
In this section, before building the theoretical model, we show the economic impacts 
of the carbon tax in the framework of partial equilibrium analysis on the automobile 
fuel market. In this context, suppose that the carbon tax is levied on the automobile fuel. 
In figure 1, the demand and marginal cost curve in the fuel market are drawn. Without 
carbon tax case, the pricing scheme yields to the market equilibrium point A. Levying 
the carbon tax equivalent to BF on fuel services moves the market equilibrium from 
point A to the point B through the shift of marginal cost curve. 
This movement of market equilibrium point decreases the social surplus from CAD 
to EBD. In another word, the economic loss, CABE is generated. However the CFBE is 
the amount of paying the carbon tax which is equal to the government’s gain as tax 
revenue. Hence the government revenue CFBE is deducted from CABE, so FAB is the 
net economic loss due to introduce the carbon tax. This is called to deadweight loss of 
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Figure 1. Impacts due to introduce the carbon tax 
 
3.  Structure of Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model 
 
3.1 Assumptions 
    We have the following major assumptions. 
(a) An economy consists of a representative household, industries (Eight transport 
sectors and five other sectors) and a central government, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
(b) The industry provides commodities/services by inputting factors that consist of 
labor and capital, and intermediate goods. 
(c) The household gains income by supplying factors and consumes 
commodities/services provided by industries under the budget constraint. 
(d) We are modeled the savings behavior of household. The savings are appropriated the 
investment in all, by which the next period capital stock is accumulated. The 
decision making of savings is assumed to be done under the myopic expectation, 
where people consider that the present circumstance is continuous at next period. 
(e) All transport services both of passenger and freight are supplied by the transport sectors. However private automobile trips consumed by household are provided by 
his own.   
(f)  Markets are considered on each commodity, labor and capital. They are assumed to 
be perfectly competitive. 
(g) The central government levies the carbon tax on automobile fuels, which consist of 
gasoline and light-oil. A part of tax revenue is appropriated the subsidy to 
purchasing of the clean energy vehicles, and the rest of them is done to provide the 




































































Emission level of CO2 Emission level of CO2
 
Figure 2. Framework of the dynamic computable general equilibrium model (t-period) 
 
3.2 Industries’ behavior 
  Industries  produce  commodities/services  by inputting factors and intermediate goods. 
Its behavior model is built by the nested structure (in Figure 3), that is, at first, 
industries determine on input volume of the composite factor and each intermediate 
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Figure 3. Outline of industries’ behavior 
    At first step, the industries’ behaviors inputting the composite factor and intermediate 
goods are formulated as minimization of production costs under Leontief type 
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min , , 0 LL  (1b) 
Where,  j PC : production capacity (input volume of composite factor),  xj
i : intermediate 
goods input volume from industryi to industry j,  j y : output volume,  cj: unit cost of 
composite factor,  pi : the price of commodity i ,  a j
0 : production capacity rate 
[production capacity for the unit output],  ( ) ai j
i ≠ 0 : input coefficient in Leontief Matrix 
and  Cj: product cost. 
    Solving the programming in (1), we obtain production capacity  j PC  and 
intermediate goods input volume xj
i , respectively. 
  PC a y jj j =
0  (2a) 




j =  (2b) 
Substitution of the (2) into the (1) gives the product cost  Cj in  industry j, 











0  .  (3) 
  At second step, industries decide on input volume of each factor. The behavior is 
formulated as minimization of the cost for input factors under Cobb-Douglass type 
technology constraint. 
  cp L p K j LK Lj K j
jj
=+ min
,  (4a) 







Where,  j j K L , : labor and capital input volume, respectively,  K L p p , : labor wage and 
capital rent, respectively and 
j j K L j α α η , , : parameters [ 1 = +
j j K L α α ]. 
  The solution of cost minimization programming for input factors in (4) yields to the 
input volume of each factor demand function 
j j K L D D ,  for  unit PCj. 


























































Substituting (5) into the (4), we obtain the unit cost of composite input factorcj, 
















































αα . (6) 
 
3.3 Price vector of products 
  The  price  [ j p ] of commodity j   is led through the zero profit condition in industry j . 











0 , . (7) 
  The carbon tax and the subsidy for the clean energy vehicle are assumed to be 
imposed/provided on input factor costcj. So  Cj  is represented like this. 











0 1 , τ . (8) 
Where,  τ j : tax/subsidy rate. 
  The  subsidy  rate τ j   may be considered as negative tax. 
    We can have the profit of industry j   from (8) as below, 











0 1 , . (9) 
Where,  j π : profit of industry j . 
    The (9) is linear type for  j y , so the market equilibrium solutions exist under the zero 
profit condition. Its condition gives the commodity price j p , 





0 1 , τ . (10) 
    By arranging (10), we obtain a price vector of commodity, 
  [] ′ = ′⋅−
− pc I A  
1. (11) 
Where,  p: price vector of commodity,  c: product vector of composite factor unit cost 
by production capacity rate, I : unit matrix, A : input coefficient matrix and ’: 
transposed matrix. 
 
3.4 Behavior of clean energy vehicle product industry 
  In Japan, the clean energy vehicle is beginning to be diffused. Though its product 
price is higher than the one of general vehicles, it is expected that the accumulation of 
them may decrease its price by learning effects in its product industry. In this paper, we 
will grasp the leaning effects through the next formulation of clean energy vehicle 
industry’s product behavior, in which an additional fix cost is introduced. Its cost is 








C y  of clean energy vehicle 








C y . The product 
behavior of clean energy vehicle is described like below, 
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Where, subscriptC: clean energy vehicle product industry,  FC: additional fix cost, 
YC








C y . 
  The optimal solutions of (12) are the same with previous obtained solutions of other industries. But the product cost is increased by the additional fix cost. 













− 01 1 , τ  (13) 
And the clean energy vehicle’s price is led as below,   





t =+ + + ∑
− 01 1 , τ  (14) 
  From this result, even if the clean energy vehicle product industry has the same 
technology with another general automobile product industry, the price of them is risen 
up by additional fix cost FC. However, as being increased the number of them,  FC is 
decreased less and the difference of price between the clean energy vehicle and another 
general vehicle is gradually shortened. 
    In figure 4, we show the actual values of accumulated vehicles and its selling price on 
the case of T type produced by the Ford, and we estimate the additional fix cost function 
()
1 − t
C Y FC  based on their values. But  ( )
1 − t
C Y FC  in Figure 4 is adjusted by the actual data 
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Figure 4. Estimated price of clean energy vehicle 
 
3.5 Household behavior 
(1) Outline of model 
Household gains income by providing the input factors which consist of labor and 
capital, and determines the consuming volume of commodities/services so as to 
maximize his utility under the budget constraint. Hence the consuming behavior of the 
household should be illustrated in a nested structure, as shown in figure 5. This structure 
has been proposed by Shoven and Whalley(1992). 
(2) Formulation of consuming behavior 
At first stage, the household determines consumption levels of present goods H  and 
savings F C , and, at second stage, ones of composite goods, leisure time and total 
passenger trips, and, at third stage, ones of each commodity and total freight transport 
services, and, at fourth stage, ones of each traffic mode on freight transport. The choice 
models on passenger trips are formulated in more detail by using the nested logit model 
that will be explained at next section.   
From the first stages to fourth one, household behaviors are formulated by general  Household
First Stage
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Figure 5. Outline of household nested consuming behavior 
 
utility maximize programming as below, 





l x U V
l
j
max =  (15a) 





l ∑ =  (15b) 
Where, superscript l : number of stage, superscript  j : commodity or service, 
l U : 
direct utility function, 
l
j x : consuming volume of commodity/service j , 
l
j p : price of 
commodity/service j , 
l M : income, 
l V : utility level. 
  Corresponding this utility maximization program to the nested consuming behavior 
shown in figure 5, the specified forms of household behavior as table 1 is obtained. The 
utility functions of the first, second and fourth stage, are adopted the CES type, and at 
the third state, it is done the Cobb-Douglas type. And the optimal solutions of those 
mathematical programming are also expressed in table 1. 
  In this model, household’s income is defined by full income included the time 
concept that implies endowment of time. The endowment of time is given like this. 




Where,  Ω : endowment of time, S L : labor providing time,  S : leisure time,  m t : required 
time of traffic mode  m, 
P
m x : consuming volume of passenger trips by mode  m. 
  By being introduced the time concept into model, the utility maximizing program 
yields to the distribution of time consumption as well as the one for each commodities 
/services. 
    Substituting the optimal solutions solved in (15) into its objective function, we obtain 
utility level 
l V . 
 Table 1. Formulation of household consuming behavior 
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pH :present goods price,  pF :saving price,  Ω : endowment of time,  K : endowment of 
capital,  M
1 : full income, βH : parameter, σl : elasticity of substitution, 
νl : () =− σσ ll 1 ,  V : utility level. 
HX S T



















2 2  











































( )( ) ( ) ∆ 2
11 1 22 2 =+ +
−− − γγ γ
σσ σ




( 2 = l ) 
pX : Composite goods price,  pTP :Total passenger transport price, 
M
2 : =− Mp C FF
1* * , γ γ γ XlP ,, :parameters,  H : Utility level gotten from consuming 
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s.t. px p T M jj
j
TF F ∑ +=
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( j :each commodity except automobile, fuel 
and freight transport) 

















(l = 3) 
pj′ : each commodity price,  pTF : total freight transport price,  M
3 腆
=− − Mp Xp T XT P P
2* ** * ,  ς ς jF , : parameters,  X : Utility level gotten from consuming 
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Freight transport consumption of each 























(l = 4 ) 
p j′: freight transport price,  M
4 :=− ∑ Mp x jj j
3* * ,  χ j: parameters,  X F : Utility level 
gotten from consuming volume of freight transport services. 
 
  () VV p M
ll
j
ll = ,  (17) 
  The commodity/service price at the  l th stage is led through transforming the result 
of (17) and the budget constraint equation at the same stage as below. 






−1  (18) Table 2. Specified utility level of household and commodity price 
  Utility level  Commodity price 
First stage 
(l =1)  () VM =⋅ − 1
1
1
1 1 ∆ σ  Present  goods:  () pH = − ∆ 2
1
1 2 σ  
Second stage 
(l = 2 )  () HM =⋅ − 2
2
1
















































Total freight transport:  () pTF = − ∆ 4
1
1 4 σ  
Fourth stage 
(l = 4 )  () XM F =⋅ − 4
4
1
1 4 ∆ σ      
 
    We show the results of solved 
l V  and 
l p   in table 2. Here, we want to emphasis that 
the nested utility maximizing behaviors become to be consistent by leading the relation 
among prices of each stage as (18). 
  Next, we explain the saving behavior of household. The savings are led under the 
balance of returns and loss generated by investing all savings to accumulation of capital 
stock. The return of investment is given as capital rent dividend. Supposing the myopic 
expectation in this model, the household consider next period’s rent the same as present 
one. So such rent dividend is expressed as 
  I pK  (19) 
Where,  I : investment volume, that corresponds with accumulation of capital stock.   
  K I ∆ =  (20) 
  On the other hand, the loss of investment is yielded as value of the present good 
consumption that has been given up by investing. This consumption is defined as the 
future goods  F C  that is formulated at first stage in table 1. Assuming myopic 
expectation, the price of  F C   is equivalent to the present composite good’s price. 
    From these result, the balance equation (21) between return and loss of investment, is 
to be constructed. 
  pI pC KX F =  (21) 
  Here assuming  I p  to investment price, which will be introduced in (25) at next 
paragraph. Hence  I pI  indicates the amount value of investment and implies also the 













=  (22) 







≡  (23) 
  T h e   F p   can be considered as the price of future goods,  F C . Obtaining the numerical 
F p  by (23), we can solve the utility maximize programming at the first state. The 
optimal solutions of its programming give also the value of future goods that implies amount of investment from equation of (22). The investing amount is appropriated to 
purchasing invest goods to accumulate the capital stock. The purchasing volume of 













j x : purchasing volume of investment goods,  j ξ : expenditure share of 
investment goods. 
  From  the  definition  of  j ξ , the investment price,  I p  is  obtained  as  
  ∑ =
j
j j I p p ξ . (25) 
(3) Formulation of passenger trip consuming behavior 
  In this section, we try to introduce the modal choice for the consumption of total 
passenger trips,  P T  (see  2 = l   in table 1). 
  At first, the household is divided into two types, which are one owning the private 
automobile by previous period and not owning (see figure 6). The household of 
automobile owner chooses the traffic mode from the railway, bus, airplane and private 
automobile. On the other hand, the household of non-automobile owner decides whether 
he purchases the private automobile or not. The household, who determines to purchase 
a new automobile, chooses the used fuel type from the gasoline, diesel and clean energy. 
The household purchasing a new automobile decides on modal choice from traffic 
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Figure 6. Outline of passenger transport service consuming behavior   We model those passenger trips consuming behavior of household in the framework 
of nested logit model. The behavior model at one level is formulated as well as 


























  1 . t . s = ∑
m
l
m P  (26b) 
Where, superscript l : number of level, subscript m : traffic mode of passenger 
transport (example), 
l
m P : choice probability of mode m,  m q : generalized transport 
price and 
l θ : logit parameter. 
  The programming in (26) yields to the probability functions expressed by the logit 
model. 















exp  (27) 
Substituting (27) into objective function of (26), we obtain inclusive expected 
generalized transport price  h q   as logsum variable. 




l h q q θ
θ
exp ln
1  (28) 
  Corresponding this expected transport cost minimization program in (26) to the 
nested transport choice behavior illustrated in figure 6, we can get the specified model 
shown in table 3. The optimal programming is indicated on the left side of table 3, and 
the logit models and logsum variables obtained by being solved its programming is 
done on the right side. The logsum variable is equivalent to the cost function of upper 
choice model. Though the automobile owning probability is not led as logit model and 
the logsum variable also can not be obtained, the total passenger transport price,  TP p  is 
given by the weighted average of its probability.   
 
3.6 Government behavior 
  The government levies the carbon tax for CO2 emissions on automobile fuel 
consumption. A part of tax revenue is appropriated the subsidy to diffuse of the clean 
energy vehicles, and the rest of them is done to provide the government services as 
general funds. When the government service is supplied, it consumes some 














j x : volume of government consumption,  j ς : expenditure share of government 
consumption, 
T Ψ : tax revenue of carbon tax,  ( ) 0 ≤ Ψ Ψ
S S : subsidy for clean energy 
vehicle. 
  The household utility has been increased by providing the government service. The 
benefit of utility increasing is assumed simply to be equivalent to the amount of 
expenditure to government service,  [ ]
S T Ψ + Ψ . 
 
 Table 3. Formulation of transport choice model on the passenger trips 
























m ∑ = 1 
The generalized transport price of   
each traffic mode 
Non-automobile:  qp mm = + pt Lm  




m t p p q + = ′ κ  
Choosing probability of mode  m:  
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The average generalized transport price of 
automobile owning or purchasing 
























Subscript  m: traffic mode (m′ : automobile), subscript  h: fuel type of automobile,  pm : 
passenger transport service price,  tm : required time of mode  m,  h κ : ratio of spending 
fuel for unit trip, 
h











































h ∑ = 1 

























































The average passenger transport price of 






































A p : automobile product price, 
h
m x ′: automobile consuming volume,  θ

























o ∑ = 1 
 
 
Purchasing probability of   




















The average passenger transport price of 








B ln exp  
 
Purchasing 




Subscript  o : implying to purchase ( B ) or not purchase ( B ), superscript  H : 
non-automobile owner,  θ
B : logit parameter. 
















t−1 : Number of automobile owned at previous period, δ : depreciation rate of 
automobile,  xz : purchasing volume of new automobiles,  N : number of population. 
 
3.7 Market equilibrium conditions 
  The markets in this model are considered on each commodity, labor and capital. So 
the market equilibrium conditions of them are formalized as 
 Commodity  market:  [] yI A x
1 =−
−  (30a)  Labor  market:  LL j
j
S ∑ =  (30b) 
 Capital  market:  KK j
j
S ∑ = . (30c) 
Where,  y: vector of domestic product volume,  x: vector of domestic final demand.   
  The domestic final demand  x consists of the consuming demands of household j x , 
investment
I
j x  and government
G
j x . The Consuming demands of household are obtained 
from table 1 and 3, the one of investment is done in (24) and the one of government is 
done in (29).   
j j K L ,   are labor and capital demand at industry j , respectively, and  S S K L ,  are  labor 
supply and endowment of capital at the period, respectively. Concretely,  j j K L ,  is led 
below as 
 
j L j j j D y a L
0 =  (31a) 
 
j K j j j D y a K
0 = . (31b) 
Where, 
j j K L D D ,   are yielded from (5) and  j y   is done from (30a). 
  On the other hand, labor supply S L  is obtained from the difference between the 
endowment of time and the time spent for leisure and passenger trip as (32). 
  ∑ − − Ω =
m
P
m m S x t S L
* *  (32) 
And the endowment of capital is led by adding capital accumulation to capital stock at 
previous period, from which capital consumption is deducted. 
  ( )
1 1 1






S K K K δ  (33) 
Where,  δ : capital consumption ratio. 
 
4.  Estimation of CO2 emission and definition of market disbenefit 
 
  T h e  C O 2 emissions are estimated by multiplying the CO2 emission’s coefficients to 
the consuming volume of automobile fuel. Here, the CO2 emission’s coefficient of 
gasoline is adopted 643 [gC/l] and the one of light-oil is done 721 [gC/l], which were 
proposed by Kondo and Moriguchi (1997). 
  The market disbenefit is measured by the concept of equivalent variation (EV). The 
EV in this dynamic model should be defined by the household utility level gotten from 
only present goods consumption, where the utility generated by savings is not included. 
Because the savings at the period is actualized in the future, and to include into the 
benefit of its period becomes double count. 
    The utility level of consuming present goods has been obtained at the second stage of 
table 2 as H . Hence the definition of EV based on the  H   is indicated as 















t M p p p H EV M p p p H
2 2 , , , , , , = +  (34) 
Where, superscript  AB , : expressing with carbon tax and without, respectively. 
    The EV of (34) is led below by using the specified form of  H   in table 2. 




























 (35) The second term of RHS (35) is added as result of household’s utility increasing with 
being provided the government service. 













Where.  i : social discount rate. 
 
5.  Measuring market disbenefit of carbon taxation 
 
5.1 Parameter setting 
  As for setting the parameters of each function in the DCGE model, we adopt the 
calibration method following Shoven and Whalley(1992). The calibration method is the 
way in which the parameters are determined under the condition reproducing the 
benchmark equilibrium data set. Here, we set the benchmark year in 1995. The data set 
is basically constructed by using the input-output table in 1995 and the national 
accounts. And basing on the data set, the parameters of the product and utility function 
are determined. The result of estimated parameters is shown in table 4 and 5. 
We build data set on transport sectors by referring the “Road traffic economic survey” 
as well as the input-output table or the national accounts. Using the data set on transport 
sector, logit parameters can be determined. Here, the parameters has been estimated by 
giving the price elasticity of automobile furl demand as well as reproducing the data in 
1995.  
The setting the price elasticity allows us to execute the simulating analysis according 
to the sensitivity with introducing carbon tax. Actually, the logit parameter is obtained 




l P q − = 1 1 θ ε  (37a) 
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θ θ . (37b) 
Where,  ε : price elasticity of automobile fuel demand, superscript  1995: data in 1995. 
  The parameters on each level of passenger transport consuming behavior in table 3, 
are estimated as result like table 6. Where, we pick up two elasticity setting cases that 
ε   are 0.3 and 0.1. 
 
5.2 Result of simulation in the BAU case 
The simulating results of future are shown in figure from 7 to 10 without introducing 
the automobile related carbon tax, in the other words business as usual (BAU) case. As 
for the results on passenger trips, the estimated dynamic path of passenger-km is 
indicated by dividing the case into  3 . 0 = ε  and  1 . 0 = ε . Seeing this results carefully, it 
becomes known that automobile passenger-km in the case of  3 . 0 = ε   is estimated upper 
level than in the case of  1 . 0 = ε . The reason leading such results can be understood from 
figure 11, in which the fact declining the automobile fuel price relatively toward the 
future is expressed. The difference of estimated automobile passenger-km generated the   Table 4.    Parameters of product function 
Labor Capital
Agriculture/Manufacture 335.99 0.7448 0.2552 0.3402
Gasoline automobile industry 627.54 0.8171 0.1829 0.1787
Diesel automobile industry 627.54 0.8171 0.1829 0.1787
CEV industry 627.54 0.8171 0.1829 0.1787
Gasoline product industry 44.10 0.5274 0.4726 0.5156
Light-oil product industry 44.10 0.5274 0.4726 0.5156
Electric/gas/water 61.56 0.5616 0.4384 0.4457
Commerce 618.43 0.8154 0.1846 0.6681
Finance/insurance 224.46 0.6997 0.3003 0.6118
Real estate 0.35 0.0811 0.9189 0.8030
Railway passenter 487.29 0.7874 0.2126 0.3756
Road passenger 2007.02 0.9683 0.0317 0.7346
Private automobile passenger 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Aviation transport 2381.18 0.9987 0.0013 0.3151
Railway freight 1996.07 0.9674 0.0326 0.4140
Road freight 1658.06 0.9404 0.0596 0.6429
Private automobile Freight 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Water transport 840.15 0.8523 0.1477 0.3569
Communication 407.79 0.7668 0.2332 0.5867
Official 2364.47 0.9969 0.0031 0.6609
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Table 5.    Parameters of utility, investment and government consumption functions 
First stage Investment Government
elasticity of substitution 1.113 Agriculture/Manufacture 0.815 0.010
Share parameter(Present goods) 0.787 Gasoline automobile industry 0.033 0.000
                  (Savings) 0.213 Diesel automobile industry 0.006 0.000
Second stage CEV industry 0.000 0.000
elasticity of substitution 0.8 Gasoline product industry 0.000 0.000
Share parameter(Composite goods) 0.617 Light-oil product industry 0.000 0.000
                  (Leisure) 0.252 Electric/gas/water 0.000 0.024
                  (Total passenger tirp) 0.130 Commerce 0.075 0.000
Third stage Finance/insurance 0.000 0.000
Share parameter(Agri./Manu.) 0.144 Real estate 0.000 0.000
                  (Electric/gas/water) 0.015 Railway passenter 0.000 0.000
                  (Commerce) 0.198 Road passenger 0.000 0.000
                  (Finance/insurance) 0.015 Private automobile passenger 0.000 0.000
                  (Real estate) 0.134 Aviation transport 0.000 0.000
                  (Total freight transport) 0.021 Railway freight 0.000 0.000
                  (Communication) 0.009 Road freight 0.005 0.000
                  (Official) 0.102 Private automobile Freight 0.000 0.000
                  (Service) 0.361 Water transport 0.000 0.000
Fourth stage Communication 0.000 0.000
elasticity of substitution 0.8 Official 0.000 0.361
Share parameter(Railway freight) 0.0053 Service 0.066 0.605
                  (Road transport) 0.7683 Endowment of time 291,807 [Million hour]
                  (Private auto freight) 0.0000 Capital Stock in 1995 932,235,000 [Billion yen]
                  (Water transport) 0.2265 Capital consumption ratio 0.09734
H β
























K δ  
Table 6.    Parameters of passenger transport service consuming model 
The case of  The case of 
Purchasing Fuel choice Modal Choice Purchasing Fuel choice Modal Choice
Logit parameter -0.00995 -0.00995 -0.550 -0.00995 -0.00995 -0.190
Constant term 0.298 -3.558 1.627 0.298 -3.558 -0.734
B θ
S θ
M θ B θ
S θ
M θ
3 . 0 = ε 1 . 0 = ε
 
one of CO2 emissions gotten in the both case of  3 . 0 = ε and  1 . 0 = ε . The estimated 
increasing rate of CO2 emissions in 2010 comparing with 1990 is 43.0% in the case of 
3 . 0 = ε , and is 39.0% in the case of  1 . 0 = ε . 
 
5.3 Result of simulation for introducing the carbon tax 
  The carbon tax levied on CO2 emissions is indicated as t [yen/gC]. Using the 
coefficients of CO2 emissions that of gasoline is 643 [gC/l] and of light-oil is 721 [gC/l], 
the imposed amounts of carbon tax are obtained as 643t [yen] and 721t [yen],  Estimating Gross domestic product
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Figure 9. Change of commodity price 
 
respectively. We simulate the market disbenefit with DCGE model by changing the tax 
rate t (yen/gC). Where, the carbon tax policy is introduced from 2003 and the tax rate do 
not change after introducing policy. Executing the numerical simulation, the relation of 
carbon tax t and the increasing rate of CO2 emissions are shown in figure 10. 
  The carbon taxes requested to accomplish the CO2 emissions regulatory target at 
transport sector are 112 [thousand yen/tC] in the case of  3 . 0 = ε  and 119 [thousand 
yen/tC] in the case of  1 . 0 = ε . The results express that the carbon tax level is the case of 
3 . 0 = ε  is higher than in the case of  1 . 0 = ε . Though the case of  3 . 0 = ε  is more 
sensitive for introducing the policy, the reason led such results is considered that the 
CO2 emissions of BAU case is more increasing in the case of  3 . 0 = ε  than  1 . 0 = ε . 
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Figure 10. Carbon tax and CO2 increasing rate, and fuel price 
 
and light-oil is also drawn. Seeing this graph, it is indicated that rising rate of light-oil 
price for increasing carbon tax is higher than the one of gasoline price. From this figure, 
the fuel prices when introducing the carbon tax policy to accomplish the regulatory 
target, become clear that the gasoline and light-oil prices are 113.2(yen/l) and 
169.8(yen/l) respectively in the case of  3 . 0 = ε , and those are 119.2(yen/l) and 
197.3(yen/l) respectively in the case of  1 . 0 = ε . 
  Next, the measured results of market disbenefit are shown in figure 11. They are 
1,810(Billion yen) in the case of  3 . 0 = ε  and 2,490(Billion yen) in the case of  1 . 0 = ε . 
Here, in the figure 11, the point that the market disbenefit becomes zero implies the role 
as the carbon tax of the fuel tax levied at present. Hence it is calculated that the 
increasing rates of carbon tax to accomplish the regulatory target are 83.1% in the case 









































20 40 60 80 100 120




Price elasticity : 0.3



















































20 40 60 80 100 120 20 40 60 80 100 120




Price elasticity : 0.3
Price elasticity : 0.1
Price elasticity : 0.3
Price elasticity : 0.1
Existing state
 
Figure 11. Carbon tax and market disbenefit 
 
5.4 Result of simulation for the subsidy to the clean energy vehicle 
  As for the subsidy to the clean energy vehicle, we simulate the change of increasing 
rate of CO2 emissions and the market disbenefit with introducing the subsidy policy and 
obtain the result shown in figure 12. Where, the price elasticity is set  1 . 0 = ε  and 
carbon tax level is done t = 112[thousand yen/tC]. 
  The result in figure 12 indicates that the increasing rate of CO2 has been reducing  0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14%
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Figure 12. Subsidy rate for CEV and CO2 increasing rate or market disbenefit 
less for raising the subsidy rate, and the market disbenefit has been generating more. As 
for the impact that the subsidy gives to market disbenefit, it is thought the effect by 
being declined the price of clean energy vehicle and negative effect by being decreased 
the carbon tax revenue through the government service. From the result, we are known 
that the reducing the CO2 emissions can be done by 6.4% of subsidy rate without 
generating more market disbenefit. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
  In this paper, the impacts with introducing the automobile related carbon tax have 
been evaluated by using the dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model. 
Here, setting the difference price elasticity in the fuel demand, the reducing volume of 
CO2 emissions and market disbenefit have been computed for each case. Those results 
are concluded as below. 
i)  The case of price elasticity  3 . 0 = ε : The carbon tax requested to accomplish the CO2 
emissions regulatory target at transport sector (to control CO2 emissions by 17% 
increasing in 2010 comparing with 1990) is 112[thousand yen/tC]. However, in 
which the present fuel tax is included, hence its carbon tax level is equivalent to the 
raising tax rate 83.1% comparing with present situation. With introducing this 
carbon tax policy, the market disbenefit is generated 1,810[Billion yen] and the GDP 
is declined by 0.5%. 
ii)  The case of price elasticity  1 . 0 = ε : The requested carbon tax of this case is 
119[thousand yen/tC], and the raising tax rate is 95.1%. With introducing this policy, 
the market disbenefit is 2,490[Billion yen] and the GDP is declined by 0.56%. 
  From these results, it has been known that the difference of fuel price elasticity does 
not give so serious impact to the reduction of CO2 emissions. The reason is thought that 
the effects decreasing CO2 emissions with policy is possible to cancel out by changing 
the CO2 emissions in BAU case, if the price elasticity is set to difference case.   
However, in this study, we could not analyze the impacts by changing the fuel price 
elasticity of transport industry sectors. And it is remained as future tasks that are the 
reconsideration of myopic expectation or the analysis introducing the carbon tax for 
industrial sector except automobile sector.    
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